This is a collection of the key articles written by renowned Wittgenstein scholar, G.P. Baker, on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, published posthumously. Following Baker’s death in 2002, the volume has been edited by collaborator and partner, Katherine Morris. Contains articles previously only available in other languages, and one previously unpublished paper. Completely distinct from the widely-known work Baker did with P.M.S. Hacker in the Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations.

The volume is a collection of papers on certain aspects of Indian history, historiography and culture. The papers are fundamental, insightful and path-breaking to some extent. Combining literary, archaeological, scientific and other perspectives, they cover a range of subjects stretching from ancient to modern India. The volume deals with the Greek historians, the Indian epic and Puranic tradition of historiography, colonial and cultural expansion of the Aryans, the early history of north-west India, society, trade and commerce in ancient India, economic, (...) political and cultural contacts of India with other parts of Asia in ancient and medieval periods, and the 1857 War of Independence in India. It takes up some very interesting and new subjects like role of Brahmanas in the anti-Alexander movement in north-west India and the concept of national integration in ancient India. It explores the sources of history of Uttar Pradesh and the antiquity of Ayodhya and historicity of Rama in an interesting study. The volume will be of immense use to historians and scholars of philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter offers an essay on the evolution of evolvability. It investigates the most frequently cited arguments against the possibility that the evolution of evolvability might be the result of selection favoring more evolvable genotypes. The chapter argues that all these arguments have not been rigorously analyzed by their proponents, and are thus a self-inflicted blind spot in evolutionary biology, and indicates that there are no deep conceptual obstacles for population genetic theory to explain the evolution of evolvability. The very (...) focus on this subject will help shift the perspective of evolutionary biology toward a more holistic, systemic view of evolution. (shrink)

In ‘Wittgenstein on Language and Rules’, Professor N. Malcolm took us to task for misinterpreting Wittgenstein's arguments on the relationship between the concept of following a rule and the concept of community agreement on what counts as following a given rule. Not that we denied that there are any grammatical connections between these concepts. On the contrary, we emphasized that a rule and an act in accord with it make contact in language. Moreover we argued that agreement in judgments and (...) in definitions is indeed necessary for a shared language. But we denied that the concept of a language is so tightly interwoven with the concept of a community of speakers as to preclude its applicabilty to someone whose use of signs is not shared by others. Malcolm holds that ‘This is an unwitting reduction of Wittgenstein's originality. That human agreement is necessary for “shared” language is not so striking a thought as that it is essential for language simpliciter.’ Though less striking, we believe that it has the merit of being a true thought. We shall once more try to show both that it is correct, and that it is a correct account of Wittgenstein's arguments. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Tractatus and rules of logical syntax From logical syntax to philosophical grammar Rules and rule‐formulations Philosophy and grammar The scope of grammar Some morals.

The dictum ‘“ought” implies “can”’ has a status in moral philosophy in some respects like that of ‘a good player needs good co-ordination’ in talk about ball-games. Clearly, you say something important but not conclusive about proficiency in playing a ball-game when you say that it requires good co-ordination: similarly, you say something important but not conclusive about obligation when you say that it implies a certain possibility or power or ability. Each dictum is a reminder: the one about such (...) courses of physical instruction, the other about such exhortations to duty, as are worth persevering with. It would be hopeless to keep on teaching a boy the moves and tricks of rugby football if he could never co-ordinate well enough to get his eye in, so to speak. Correspondingly, it would be meaningless to recommend that someone ought to do something the specification of which involved a contradiction, and pointless to suggest that he ought to do something which, for quite general reasons, was not, and was certain to remain not, within his power. So each dictum expresses a bluff, no-nonsense wisdom which we should count on before involving ourselves in certain more detailed commitments. But probably this is as far as the comparison between the two sayings can well be taken. (shrink)

Plotinus (204/5–270 CE) was the first and greatest of Neoplatonic philosophers. His writings were edited by his disciple Porphyry, who published them sometime between 301 and 305 CE in six sets of nine treatises each (Enneads), with a biography of his master in which he also explains his editorial principles.

Among the most outstanding discoveries of the last century is one that is not quite as momentous as the theory of relativity or cybernetics. It may even still be enigmatic. It has no one single author, it is not expressed in a single formula, conception, or invention. Nonetheless it is worth all the others combined.

G. P. Meredith; XIII—Words as Instruments, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 62, Issue 1, 1 June 1962, Pages 241–260, https://doi.org/10.1093/aris.

G. P. Meredith; XIII—Words as Instruments, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 62, Issue 1, 1 June 1962, Pages 241–260, https://doi.org/10.1093/aris.